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Abstract
We present unambiguous experimental evidence for (quantum-like) probabilistic contextuality in psychology. All
previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations
of marginal selectivity in behavioral data, making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics
inapplicable. In our crowdsourcing experiment respondents were making two simple choices: of one of two characters in
a story (The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen), and of one of two characteristics, such as Kind and Evil, so that
the character and the characteristic chosen matched the story line. The formal structure of the experiment imitated
that of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version. Marginal selectivity was violated, indicating
that the two choices were directly influencing each other, but the application of a mathematical test developed in the
Contextuality-by-Default theory, extending the traditional quantum-mechanical test, indicated a strong presence of
contextuality proper, not reducible to direct influences.
KEYWORDS: concept combinations, context-dependence, contextuality, direct influences, marginal selectivity.
It is commonplace to say that human behavior is context-dependent. What is usually meant by this is that one’s response
to stimulus S (performance in task S) depends on other stimuli (tasks) S′. Asked to explain the meaning of LINE, one’s
answer will depend on whether the word is preceded by CHORUS or OPENING. Visual size perception, if interpreted as
a response to retinal size, is influenced by distance cues. In all such cases one can avoid speaking of context-dependence
by simply including the relevant elements of S′ into S: visual size is a response to both retinal size and distance cues, the
meaning of LINE is a response to the word LINE and to the words preceding it. J. J. Gibson’s psychophysics (1950, 1960)
was, essentially, a change from understanding a percept as a response to a target stimulus modified by context stimuli
(as, e.g., in H. von Helmholtz’s, 1867, theory of unconscious inference) to a “direct” response to all relevant aspects of the
optical flow.
S
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
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Figure 1: R is a random variable interpreted as a response to S: as S changes, the distribution of R generally changes. It
also changes as the “context stimuli” S′ change. The influences of S and S′ upon R are both direct.
This form of context-dependence is depicted in Fig. 1, with the acknowledgement of the obvious fact that all psycho-
logical responses are random variables, generally varying from one presentation to another or from one person to another
(Thurstonian cases I and II, respectively). Figure 1 therefore presents a probabilistic response R to S, such that its dis-
tribution is influenced not only by S but also by S′. This means, of course, that the identity of the response R as a
random variable is different for different S′, at a fixed S: one and the same random variable cannot have two different
distributions.
One might think that all context-dependence is of this nature: we simply have some “secondary” factors influencing
the distribution of one’s response to a “primary” one. Quantum mechanics, however, provides striking examples of another
form of context-dependence, when the distribution of R at a fixed S does not change with S′, but R nevertheless is not
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Figure 2: The situation when R, interpreted as a response to S, changes its identity but not its distribution as “context
stimuli” S′ change. This can be revealed by looking at how R is co-distributed with other random variables as S′ changes.
The influence of S on R is direct, while influence of S′ on R is “purely contextual.”
α1	
β2	
α2	
β1	
Figure 3: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm adapted to spins by Bohm (Bohm & Aharonov, 1957) and famously inves-
tigated by Bell (1964). Two spin-1/2 particles (e.g., electrons) are created in what is called a “singlet state” and move
away from each other. Alice measures the spin of the left particle along one of the two axes denoted α1 and α2, Bob
simultaneously does the same for the right particle along one of the two axes denoted β1 and β2. Spins are binary random
variables, with values +1 or −1. Adapted from Dzhafarov & Kujala (2016a).
one and the same random variable at different values of S′. This type of context-dependence is schematically depicted in
Fig. 2, and can be called “purely contextual.” To make sure there is no logical problem here, different random variables
R′ and R′′ may very well have the same distribution (as in the case of two different fair coins). One can distinguish them
if, e.g., R′ is positively correlated with some random variable A, R′′ is negatively correlated with some B, and A always
equals B. Obviously then, R′ and R′′ cannot be one and the same random variable, even if identically distributed.
An example of pure contextuality in quantum mechanics that is especially relevant for us (because our behavioral
experiment follows its formal structure) is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version (EPR/BB,
Fig. 3). Let us denote the spins along axes αi and βj by, respectively, Ai and Bj . As it turns out, the axes can be chosen
so that it is impossible for the identity of Ai not to depend on the choice of βj and for the identity of Bj not to depend
on the choice of αi. This is established by the following reasoning. If we assume that Ai is one and the same random
variable under β1 and β2 (and analogously for Bj under α1 and α2), then we should have four jointly distributed random
variables A1, A2, B1, B2, and the observed pairs of measurements by Alice and Bob then should be derivable from this
distribution as its marginals (A1, B1), (A1, B2), (A2, B1), and (A2, B2). If so, these pairwise joint distributions should
satisfy the following inequality, abbreviated CHSH (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt, 1969; Fine, 1982):
max
k,l∈{1,2}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j∈{1,2}
E [AiBj ]− 2E [AkBl]
∣∣∣∣∣∣− 2 ≤ 0, (1)
where E is expected value. Now, the expected values in the CHSH inequality can be computed for any axes α1, α2, β1, β2
by using the principles of quantum mechanics, and it turns out that for certain choices of these axes these expected values
violate the inequality. By reductio ad absurdum, therefore, we have to reject the initial assumption that Ai is the same
for both choices of βj and Bj is the same for both choices of αi.
In other words, Ai and Bj measured together are in fact A
j
i and B
i
j , so that, e.g., A11 (Alice’s measurement along
axis α1 when Bob has chosen axis β1) is different from A21 (Alice’s measurement along the same axis when Bob has
chosen β2). However, we do not have the same situation as in Fig. 1: Bob’s choice of an axis cannot directly influence
Alice’s measurement because this choice and the measurement are simultaneous (in some inertial frame of reference).
They cannot be causally related.1 In the past, this situation was often presented as paradoxical, with Einstein famously
1Note that the “pure contextuality” we have here is not a characteristic of the physical system comprised of the two particles in Fig. 3.
Rather it is a characteristic of the system of random variables representing a particular choice of two axes by Alice and two axes by Bob. For
the same two entangled particles but a different choice of the four axes, the system of random variables representing them may very well exhibit
no contextuality.
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Figure 4: A combination of the situations depicted in Figs. 1 and 2. As S′ changes, the distribution of R changes (i.e., S′
directly influences R), but the identity of R (revealed by looking at how R is co-distributed with other random variables)
changes more than the change in its distribution can explain. Here, influence of S′ on R is in part direct and in part
contextual.
referring to it as “a spooky action at a distance.” In fact, contextual influences involve no “actions” (i.e., no transfer of
energy or information). They simply reflect a fundamental fact of probability theory, that part of the identity of a random
variable is what other random variables it is jointly distributed with (see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2016a, 2017b, for
probabilistic foundations of contextuality). A simple analogy would be the property of being or not being “the brightest
star in the sky” considered part of each star’s identity: the identity of a given star then can change depending on the
brightness of stars that do not influence it directly. It is a basic but fascinating aspect of reality, fundamentally different
from direct influences in being non-causal (see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a, for a detailed discussion).2
With contextuality (or lack thereof) understood as a property of a system of random variables describing an aspect of a
physical system (see Footnote 1), there are no known principles, in physics or elsewhere, that would confine all contextual
systems to quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanical computations may establish certain properties of a set of particles,
and then by means of classical probability theory one may establish that a certain system of random variables describing
these properties forms a contextual system. No quantum mechanical computation, however, is based on contextuality as
a physical property. It is not surprising therefore that numerous attempts were made to reveal probabilistic contextuality
analogous to the EPR/BB one outside quantum physics, in particular, in human cognition and decision making (Aerts,
2014; Aerts et al., 2017 ; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2014; Bruza,
Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009; Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, & Sitbon, 2015; Bruza, Wang, & Busemeyer, 2015). The idea of
constructing a behavioral analogue of a quantum-mechanical experiment is simple: each experimental setting (e.g., an axis
chosen by Alice) is replaced with a task of responding to a stimulus or question, and the measurement outcome (e.g., the
spin along this axis) is replaced with a response given to this stimulus or question. With these correspondences, the design
of a behavioral experiment can be made formally identical to that of the quantum one. For instance, in the experiment
described in Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013), the axis αi corresponded to the task of choosing between two animals (one
pair for i = 1, another for i = 2), and βj corresponded to the task of choosing between two animal sounds (again, different
pairs for j = 1 and j = 2). The respondent was asked to choose an animal in response to αi and to choose the best
matching animal sound in response to βj . The expectation in this experiment was that the responses to αi and βj could
be treated as random variables Ai and Bj , respectively, and the CHSH inequality (1) could then be used to reveal the
presence or absence of contextuality.
Here, however, the study in question, as well as all other studies mentioned above, faced a serious difficulty (Dzhafarov
& Kujala 2014b; Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, & Jones, 2016; Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala, 2015). The CHSH
inequality (1) and other traditional contextuality tests in quantum mechanics are derived under the assumption of “no-
signaling” (Abramsky & Brandenburger, 2011; Adenier & Khrennikov, 2017) or “marginal selectivity” (Dzhafarov & Kujala,
2014b), which is the condition ensuring that the context does not influence random variables directly. Thus, in the classical
version of EPR/BB, the distribution of Ai does not depend on whether it is measured together with B1 or B2. Without
this condition the expression in (1) would be hopelessly confused, as the symbols it contains for random variables then
would change their meaning within the expression. In human behavior, however, this condition is almost never satisfied:
a response to a stimulus S is typically directly influenced by any stimulus S′ in the temporal-spatial vicinity of S. For
instance, in Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013), when choosing between Tiger and Cat (task α2), Tiger was chosen with
probability 0.86 when combined with the choice between Growls and Winnies (task β1), but Tiger was only chosen with
probability 0.23 when combined with the choice between Snorts and Meows (β2). There is no way therefore one can denote
the response to α2 by A2 and use Inequality 1. The change in the distribution of the response to α2 indicates that it is
directly influenced by the choice of the sound, while the CHSH inequality expressly excludes this possibility (Dzhafarov
& Kujala 2014b).
However, the presence of direct influences from S′ to R does not automatically exclude the presence of pure contex-
2A formal definition of a random variable in probability theory is that it is a measurable function mapping one probability space into another,
and it is jointly distributed with any other measurable function defined on the same domain probability space. Conversely, the set of all random
variables with which it is jointly distributed define the domain space of this random variable, which obviously is part of this variable’s identity.
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tuality: it is possible, as schematically shown in Fig. 4, that contextual influences coexist with direct ones. The situation
depicted in Fig. 2 is merely a special case, when the change in the distribution of R with S′ is nil, so whatever change
in the identity of R is observed in response to changes in S′, it is purely contextual. More generally, however, one can
consider the possibility that the distribution of R does change with S′, but the extent of this change is not sufficient to
account for the extent of the changes in R’s identity, as revealed by its joint distribution with other random variables.
This combined form of context-dependence has been studied in the mathematical theory called Contextuality-by-Default
(CbD, Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a; Dzhafarov, Kujala, &
Cervantes, 2016; Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015).
When applied to the EPR/BB system, the logic of CbD is as follows. One determines the maximal probability with
which A11 could equal A21 if the two were jointly distributed. This probability is a measure of difference between the two
distributions (the smaller the probability the larger the difference). Analogously one determines the maximal probabilities
of A12 = A22, B11 = B21 , and B12 = B22 . If this measure of difference between the distributions is sufficient to account for the
entire difference between the random variables A11 and A21, B11 and B21 , etc., then these maximal probabilities should be
compatible with the observed joint distributions of
(
A11, B
1
1
)
,
(
A21, B
1
2
)
,
(
A12, B
2
1
)
, and
(
A22, B
2
2
)
. If they are, the system
in noncontextual. If they are not, then A11 and A21, or B11 and B21 , etc., have to be more dissimilar as random variables
than they are due to the difference between their distributions. Such a system exhibits contextuality proper (“on top of”
direct influences).3
It is proved (Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2016) that the EPR/BB system is noncontextual
if and only if
maxk,l∈{1,2}
∣∣∣∑i,j∈{1,2} E [AjiBij]− 2E [AlkBkl ]∣∣∣
−∑i∈{1,2} ∣∣E [A1i ]− E [A2i ]∣∣
−∑j∈{1,2} ∣∣E [B1j ]− E [B2j ]∣∣− 2 ≤ 0.
(2)
The formula generalizes the CHSH inequality (1), which obtains if the second and third sums in the expression are zero
(no-signaling or marginal selectivity condition). When this formula was applied to behavioral experiments imitating
the EPR/BB design, all available data (Aerts, 2014; Aerts et al., 2017 ; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Bruza, Kitto,
Ramm, & Sitbon, 2015; Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017a; Zhang & Dzhafarov, 2017) were in compliance with lack of
contextuality. The same conclusion (lack of contextuality) was reached regarding behavioral experiments with other
designs (Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2014; Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017b; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013;
Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Busemeyer, 2014). This series of negative results led Dzhafarov, Zhang, and Kujala (2015)
and Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) to hypothesize that all context-dependence in behavioral and
social data may be due to direct influences, with no contextuality proper.
Inspection of Inequality 2, however, suggests another possibility: perhaps the correlations between A and B variables in
the previous attempts imitating the formal structure of the EPR/BB experiment were not strong enough. The maximum
of the first sum in (2) is large if the four expectations E
[
AjiB
i
j
]
are large in absolute value, and one of them has the
sign opposite to the sign of the remaining three. What if this maximum were large enough to offset the terms reflecting
violations of marginal selectivity and to make the left-hand side of the expression positive? Here, we report an experiment
in which contextuality proper is definitely established by achieving the desired pattern of sufficiently large correlations
between A and B variables.
The design of the experiment is similar to other behavioral imitations of the EPR/BB paradigm: the choice of an axis
is replaced by a choice between two options, the options corresponding to each α-axis being two characters from a story,
and the options corresponding to each β-axis being two characteristics which characters from the story may possess. The
story was The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen, and, e.g., the pair (α1, β1) was the offer to choose between Gerda
and the Troll (the result being A11) and also to choose between Beautiful and Unattractive (B11), so that the two choices
match the story line (in which Gerda is Beautiful and the Troll is Unattractive). The choices are offered to many people
in a crowdsourcing experiment, and the probabilities are estimated by the proportions of people making this or that pair
of choices. The expectation is that a respondent who understands the story line would choose a “correct” combination of
a character and a characteristic (e.g., either Gerda and Beautiful, or the Troll and Unattractive). If so, the max of the
first sum in Inequality 2 should equal 4 (its maximal possible value), and the presence or absence of contextuality would
3To avoid technicalities, the formulation given is far from being general and is less than rigorous. A rigorous formulation for the EPR/BB
system involves considering maximal couplings of
(
A11, B
1
1
)
,
(
A21, B
1
2
)
,
(
A12, B
2
1
)
, and
(
A22, B
2
2
)
. More complex systems require dichotomizations
of the random variables and multimaximal couplings (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2017a, 2017b).
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Character choice Characteristic choice N total (correct)
Context 1 ? Gerda ? Beautiful 447 (425)
? Troll ? Unattractive
Context 2 ? Gerda ? Kind 453 (429)
? Troll ? Evil
Context 3 ? Snow Queen ? Beautiful 446 (410)
? Old Finn Woman ? Unattractive
Context 4 ? Snow Queen ? Kind 453 (388)
? Old Finn Woman ? Evil
Table 1: Each context consisted of two choices, between two characters and between two characteristics. N total is the
number of respondents assigned to each context (the number in parentheses shows the subset of respondents whose answers
were correct, in accordance with the story line).
depend only on the the relative proportions of people preferring one correct choice to another. We will see, however, that
a fraction of respondents, more than 8%, chose “incorrect” options.
Method
Participants
1989 participants signed up for the study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Barr, J., 2005) and indicated their agreement
with a standard informed consent page in exchange for financial compensation ($0.10). No demographics were required
nor recorded. 1799 of the participants completed the experiment by answering the two questions posed to them. They
will be referred to below as respondents, and their responses were used for the analysis. The number of respondents was
planned to exceed 1600, estimated to be more than sufficient for construction of 99.99% bootstrap confidence intervals (as
explained in Results). The data were collected in January 12-14, 2017.
Materials and procedure
The experiment was set up as a “survey” on Purdue University’s Qualtrics platform (Purdue University, 2015). Each
participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions, referred to as contexts: see Table 1. The experiment
consisted in the participant being presented with the instructions (“story line”) and, on the same computer screen, offered
to make two choices forming the context assigned to this participant: of a character from a given pair of characters, and
of a suitable characteristic of this character from a given pair of characteristics. For example, in Context 3 (Table 1), the
computer screen looked as shown in Fig. 5, asking to choose between Snow Queen and Old Finn Woman and to choose
between Beautiful and Unattractive, with the instruction that the two choices had to be true to the story line (which says
that Snow Queen is Beautiful and Old Finn Woman is Unattractive).4
Results
We present the results first for correct responses only, and then for all responses, with the numbers of respondents shown
in Table 1. In Tables 2 and 3, we present the observed proportions for each combination of choices in the first and second
group, respectively. We refer to these tables of proportions (or probabilities they estimate) as “systems,” in accordance
with the terminology of “context-content systems” introduced in Dzhafarov & Kujala (2016a).
4As pointed out at the end of the Discussion section, the logic of CbD dictates that only one context (one pair of choices) be presented to a
given respondent, dividing thereby the pool of respondents into four groups, one responding to Context 1, another to Context 2, etc.
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Figure 5: The appearance of the computer screen for participants assigned to Context 3.
System of correct choices
In this system, the max of the first sum in Inequality 2 equals 4 (its maximal possible value), and the presence or absence
of contextuality depends only on the the relative proportions of two correct pairs of choices. The system is contextual
on the sample level: the left-hand side of Inequality 2 equals 0.452. To evaluate how reliable this figure is, a bootstrap
confidence interval (Davison & Hinkley, 1997) was calculated by generating n = 400, 000 resamples from each of the
contexts, computing the left hand side of Inequality 2 for each of them, choosing a confidence level C, and finding the
1−C
2 and 1− 1−C2 quantiles of their distribution. The histogram of the distribution is shown in the upper panel of Fig. 6.
For this system, the 99.99% bootstrap confidence interval for the left hand side of Inequality 2 is [0.226, 0.668]. The
confidence needed for the bootstrap interval to cover zero exceeds 99.999% since none of the 400, 000 resamples produced
a non-positive value.
System of all responses
This system is contextual on the sample level: the left-hand side of Inequality 2 equals 0.279. A bootstrap confidence
interval was calculated by generating n = 400, 000 resamples and analyzing them in the same way as for the system
of correct responses. The histogram of the distribution of values of the left hand side of Inequality 2 is shown in the
lower panel of Fig. 6. For this system, the 99.99% bootstrap confidence interval for the left hand side of Inequality 2 is
[0.008, 0.506].
Discussion
We have demonstrated that a contextual system of random variables formally analogous to the EPR/BB system in quantum
mechanics can be observed in human behavior. It has been done without making the mistake of ignoring lack of marginal
selectivity in psychological data. Marginal selectivity (or no-signaling condition), in application to the EPR/BB system,
means that the second and third sums in Inequality 2 are zero. If this were the case in our experiments (e.g., if the two
correct choices of the character-characteristic pairs were made with equal probability), the left hand side of Inequality 2
for the system with correct choices would have the maximal theoretically possible value, 2. This would make the system a
so-called PR box (Popescu & Rohrlich, 1994), a system forbidden by laws of both classical and quantum mechanics. There
is no a priori reason why a behavioral system could not violate boundaries established by quantum mechanics, but the
sample level contextuality value of 0.452 obtained in our experiment for correct responses is quite moderate, well below
the quantum boundary (so-called Tsirelson bound) of 2
(√
2− 1).5 Recall that application of Inequality 2 and similar
5Note, however, that the derivability of the Tsirelson bound without assuming non-signaling is not obvious and requires special investigation.
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B11 B
1
2
Context 1 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A11
{ Gerda 0.887 0.000 0.887
A21
{ Gerda 0.841 0.000 0.841
Troll 0.000 0.113 0.113 Troll 0.000 0.159 0.159
Mar. Characteristic 0.887 0.113 Mar. Characteristic 0.841 0.159
B21 B
2
2
Context 3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 4 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A12
{ Snow Queen 0.837 0.000 0.837
A22
{ Snow Queen 0.000 0.626 0.626
Old Finn woman 0.000 0.163 0.163 Old Finn woman 0.374 0.000 0.374
Mar. Characteristic 0.837 0.163 Mar. Characteristic 0.374 0.627
Table 2: Observed proportions of correct choices for each of the four contexts. ‘Mar.’ indicates marginal observed
proportions. To apply Inequality 2, one of the two options (no matter which) in each choice is encoded by +1, the other
by -1.
B11 B
1
2
Context 1 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A11
{ Gerda 0.843 0.020 0.864
A21
{ Gerda 0.797 0.035 0.832
Troll 0.029 0.107 0.136 Troll 0.018 0.150 0.168
Mar. Characteristic 0.872 0.128 Mar. Characteristic 0.815 0.185
B21 B
2
2
Context 3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 4 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A12
{ Snow Queen 0.769 0.011 0.780
A22
{ Snow Queen 0.135 0.536 0.671
Old Finn woman 0.070 0.150 0.220 Old Finn woman 0.320 0.009 0.329
Mar. Characteristic 0.839 0.161 Mar. Characteristic 0.455 0.545
Table 3: Observed proportions of all choices, correct and incorrect, for each of the four contexts. The rest is as in Table
2.
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Figure 6: Histograms of the bootstrap values of the left hand side of Inequality 2, for correct responses (upper panel) and
for all responses (lower panel). The solid vertical line indicates the location of the observed sample value. The vertical
dotted lines indicate the locations of the 99.99% bootstrap confidence intervals.
B11 B
1
2
Context 1 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A11
{ Gerda 0.817 0.000 0.817
A21
{ Gerda 0.911 0.000 0.911
Troll 0.000 0.183 0.183 Troll 0.000 0.089 0.089
Mar. Characteristic 0.817 0.183 Mar. Characteristic 0.911 0.089
B21 B
2
2
Context 3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Context 4 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Beautiful Unattractive Mar. Character Kind Evil Mar. Character
A12
{ Snow Queen 0.907 0.000 0.907
A22
{ Snow Queen 0.000 0.696 0.696
Old Finn woman 0.000 0.093 0.093 Old Finn woman 0.304 0.000 0.304
Mar. Characteristic 0.907 0.093 Mar. Characteristic 0.304 0.696
Table 4: Hypothetical proportions of correct choices for each of the four contexts. This system is obtained by adding or
subtracting 0.07 to/from each of the nonzero probabilities in Table 2.
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formulas to all previously reported experimental data showed no contextuality at all, leading Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala
(2015) and Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) to consider the possibility that all context-dependence
in psychology is due to direct influences only. This hypothesis is now falsified.6
Contextuality in our experiment was exhibited by both the system of correct responses and the system of all responses,
correct and incorrect. It is not clear, however, why some respondents made incorrect choices to begin with. The possibilities
range from misunderstanding of the instructions to deliberate non-compliance. This makes no difference for the formal
contextuality analysis, but one might consider the legitimacy of excluding incorrect choices as outliers.
Focusing on the system of correct responses, one might wonder if a story line that makes one of the two choices in
each context rigidly determined by the other choice (Table 1) may somehow predetermine the contextuality of the system.
Could the results reported in this paper be essentially forced by the experiment’s design? It is easy to see that this is not
the case. For example, in Table 4 all responses are correct but the system is noncontextual, with the left-hand side of
Inequality 2 equal to -0.004. No superficial inspection of this system would reveal a qualitative difference from the one in
Table 2. The question should not be therefore whether noncontextuality is compatible with the story line, but whether
the latter makes it “rare.”
One way of making the meaning of “rare” precise is as follows. The experimental design we use (considering only
correct responses) makes the value
max
k,l∈{1,2}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j∈{1,2}
E
[
AjiB
i
j
]
− 2E [AlkBkl ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
equal to 4, its maximal possible value. The system’s (non)contextuality therefore is determined entirely by the value of∑
i∈{1,2}
∣∣E [A1i ]− E [A2i ]∣∣+ ∑
j∈{1,2}
∣∣E [B1j ]− E [B2j ]∣∣ . (4)
The system is contextual if and only if this expression’s value is less than 2. In the system of correct responses
a = E
[
A11
]
= E
[
B11
]
,
b = E
[
A21
]
= E
[
B12
]
,
c = E
[
A12
]
= E
[
B21
]
,
d = E
[
A22
]
= −E [B22] .
(5)
Each of the four values a, b, c, d ranges between −1 and 1. It is reasonable now to ask how probable it is that these four
values chosen “randomly and independently” (meaning that the quadruple of the expected values is uniformly distributed
within the 4-dimensional cube) would yield (4) equal to or exceeding 2. The answer is easily obtained by Monte Carlo
simulation, and the probability in question, i.e., the probability that a randomly created system is noncontextual, turns
out to be about 0.6667. This is hardly a “rare” event.
In psychological terms, the interpretation of context-dependence in our experiment is straightforward: the meaning of
such characteristics as Kind vs Evil or Beautiful vs Unattractive is different depending on what choice of characters is
offered to ascribe these concepts to. This difference, however, cannot be fully explained by assuming that the impact of
the character choice upon the characteristic choice is “direct” (analogous to a signal propagating from Bob’s measurement
to Alice’s measurement). The direct influence is there without doubt, manifested in the lack of marginal selectivity in our
data, but the context-dependence contains a component of pure contextuality. We have no psychological terms to discern
the two parts of context-dependence. The value of contextuality analysis here is in that it provides rigorous analytic
discernments where “ordinary” psychological analysis is underdeveloped or moot.
Note that the term “direct influences” in CbD refers to mathematical properties of a specific system of random variables
rather than to physical or psychological mechanisms. Although the initial intuition of direct influences involves conventional
schemes with forces and energy transfer, in the mathematical theory direct influences are defined by the differences between
the distributions of random variables measuring (responding to) the same property in different contexts. In the EPR/BB
system, the difference between the distributions A11 and A21 is, by definition, the difference between the direct influences
exerted by β1 and β2 (or, simply, the direct influence of the β) upon the measurement of α1. If the two distributions
are identical, β exerts no direct influence, because we only think of particular random variables and of differences in
their distributions. It is perfectly possible that the two identical distributions would differ from the distribution of some
6It is worth mentioning that violations of marginal selectivity or no-signaling condition (the general CbD term being “consistent connected-
ness”) are also common in quantum physical experiments (Adenier & Khrennikov, 2007; Khrennikov, 2017, pp. 25-28). Compared to behavioral
data, however, inconsistent connectedness in quantum mechanics is relatively small, even when statistically significant, and with the use of
CbD theory pure contextuality can usually be established at extremely high level of confidence (see, e.g., the analysis of experimental data in
Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015).
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A31, had there been a third context in which α1 were measured alone or together with some β3. Moreover, it is possible
that a physical theory could establish that the influences exerted by β1 and β2 are physically different despite affecting
the distributions of A11 and A21 identically (see, e.g., Filk, 2015). Our analysis, however, does not depend on this or
that physical or psychological theory. Even in the case of the classical EPR/BB system with two particles, the Bohmian
version of quantum mechanics allows for the possibility of direct influences being responsible for the entire picture, albeit
defying special relativity. However, the EPR/BB system with a specific choice of axes would remain contextual even if
the Bohmian mechanics became universally accepted. As everything else in CbD, “direct influence” is not a physical term
(although it may be assigned a physical interpretation in many cases), it is a mathematical term that is relative to the
system of random variables in play.7
Our experiment establishes a clear template for designing analogous experiments aimed at pure contextuality, whether
in the EPR/BB or similar format. In the terminology of CbD, the EPR/BB system is a cyclic system of rank 4 (Dzhafarov,
Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015). This system involves eight binary random variables, Aij ,
Bji (i, j ∈ {1, 2}), and the design maximizing the chances of this system exhibiting contextuality (“on top of” direct
influences) is as follows. Label the values of all the random variables +1 and −1 and create a “story line” in which +1
of Aij and +1 of B
j
i are associated with a very high probability in three out of four pairs
(
Aij , B
j
i
)
, and with a very low
probability in the fourth pair (or vice versa). For other cyclic systems (say, of ranks 3 or 5) the criteria of contextuality
are similar to (2), and the design can be constructed similarly.
An important feature of the design is that each respondent should be assigned to a single context only, instead of
asking each of them to make (in the case of the EPR/BB system) all four pairs of choices (α1, β1) , . . . , (α2, β2), whether
presented simultaneously, in a fixed order, or a variable order. The reason for this is that making all four pairs of choices
would have created an empirical joint distribution of the eight random variables in play,
A11, B
1
1 , A
2
1, B
1
2 , A
1
2, B
2
1 , A
2
2, B
2
2 ,
contravening the logic of CbD in which different contexts are mutually exclusive, and different pairs
(
Aji , B
i
j
)
are not
jointly distributed (are stochastically unrelated to each other). Contextuality analysis consists in finding out whether
a joint distribution can be imposed on these eight random variables, subject to certain constraints (maximality of the
probabilities of A11 = A21, B11 = B21 , etc.). For this analysis an empirical joint distribution involving, say, A11 and A21 would
be a nuisance relation. It would have to be ignored, and an additional theory would be required to know how the ignored
relations affect the results of the analysis. Consider, e.g., the fact that every given choice (e.g., between Gerda and Troll)
in the EPR/BB system enters in two different contexts. The respondent would normally remember her previous choice
when facing it the second time, albeit in combination with another pair of characteristics (which in turn, will appear
once again, in combination with another pair of characters). It is clear that the respondent’s choice would depend on the
previously made one in some complex way (e.g., the strategy may be adopted to always repeat it, or to always choose a
new option). This would affect the marginal distributions of the choices in some unknown way. Note that our design is
not different from how the measurements are made in the quantum-mechanical EPR/BB system, where only one pair of
measurements can be performed on a given pair of entangled particles.
Jerome Busemeyer (personal communication, November 2017) mentioned to us that the “respondents” in our design
need not be people, they can be any entities to which A and B properties can be probabilistically assigned. This observation
points at ways of searching for contextual systems outside both quantum mechanics and psychology.
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